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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the importance of financial intermediation on economic growth. Using the 
Neoclassical growth framework, we raise a new issue where our model has multiple stationary 
states with threshold effect. We further confirm that financial intermediation is better than self-
financing  system  in  order  to  ensure  the  existence  and  uniqueness  of  long-run  steady  state 
equilibrium of capital stock, as well as to decrease threshold level. The presence of threshold 
effect is an important finding in studying the finance-growth nexus, since it prevents the economy 
to raise sufficient initial capital.
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1. Introduction
Since the last two decades, many literatures analyze the nexus between financial 
development and economic growth, but the findings are still subject to relevant debate 
until  nowadays2.  In  developing countries  study, particularly,  financial  development  is 
associated with banking sector development, since financial market is underdeveloped. 
However, the more recent literature suggests that financial market should be also taken 
into account to spur economic growth, even in developing countries. Using a very large 
cross-country sample incorporating both developed and developing countries, Levine and 
Servos (1998) show that stock market liquidity leads to faster rate of growth, productivity 
improvement,  and capital  accumulation3.  This result is also theoretically supported by 
Levine (1991) and Bencivenga et al (1995), where stock market liquidity also facilitates 
long-term investment, since investors can easily sell their stake in the project if they need 
liquidity  before  their  project  matures.  Enhanced  liquidity  and  long-term  investment, 
therefore, increase higher-return projects that boost productivity growth. 
Meanwhile, it is also well accepted that financial market suffers from asymmetric 
information problems and thus, financial liberalization fostering stock market liquidity or 
banking sector development is often blamed for  macroeconomic downturn, as well  as 
banking vulnerability and crisis (Bihde, 1993; Detagriache et al, 1999). This is because 
stock market  liquidity reduces shareholder’s  incentive to undertake the costly task of 
monitoring  managers.  In  turn,  weaker  corporate  governance  relating  to  unchecked 
asymmetric  information  impedes  effective  resource  allocation  and slows  productivity 
growth. Thus, the adverse effect of market-based financial system appears. This is why, 
2In empirical study see King and Levine (1993a, 1993b), Levine (1998); Rajan and Zingales (1998) for the 
country level study, and Fisman and Love (2002) at the industry level; or recently Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (2002) at the firm level. In theoretical study, see Bencivenga and Smith (1991), or recently 
Hung and Cothren (2002). Levine (2005) provide a comprehensive literature review.
3 Stock market liquidity refers to the less expensive cost of equities trading.  
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according  to  Diamond  (1984),  the  presence  of  bank  as  financial  intermediation  is 
necessary,  since  banks have  technology  to  gain  information  from  investors  which 
enhance investor’s rational decision based on their consumption profile.
Extending the previous literatures on the importance of financial intermediation, 
Bencivenga and Smith (1991) establish a general equilibrium model which shows that 
financial intermediation is better than self-financed system (financial market), in order to 
spur economic growth. In this literature, there are basic lists of bank activities such as 
deposits funded loans, holding liquid reserves against predictable withdrawal demands, 
issuing liabilities that are more liquid than their primary asset and reducing the need of 
self-financed  investment.  In  formalizing  their  model,  Bencivenga  and  Smith  (1991) 
consider that there are two types of agent (entrepreneur and non-entrepreneur) who can 
invest in either liquid or illiquid assets4. The main result of this model is that financial 
intermediation promotes the development of productive long-term investment rather than 
short-term  ventures.  Interestingly,  the  optimal  amount  of  long-term  investment  is 
negatively related with  the income of  long-term investment  itself  and the  fraction of 
entrepreneurs,  but  positively  related  with  the  income of  short-term ventures  and  the 
fraction  of  non-entrepreneurs.  Hence,  despite  the  income of  long-term investment  is 
higher than the income of short-term ventures, it does not provide enough incentive to the 
agents to be entrepreneur. Thus, entrepreneurship is not always growth-enhancing factor 
unless the opportunity cost of being entrepreneur exceeds the certain value of constraint. 
The  aim  of  this  paper  is  therefore  to  reevaluate  the  finance-growth  nexus 
developed by Bencivenga  and Smith  (1991).  In  our  model,  we use  the Neo-classical 
growth  without  externalities  in  an  overlapping  generation  model  with  three  periods 
4 Liquid  assets  are  short-term  unproductive  investments,  but  illiquid  assets  are  long-term  productive 
investments. 
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instead of drawing heavily Bencivenga and Smith’s (1991) model5. Since our motivation 
is to determine the most appropriate system in developing countries, we consider that 
externalities changes  due to human capital  and technological  innovation may be less 
important, so that they might not much play pivotal role in boosting economic growth in 
developing countries. Meanwhile, using the Neo-classical growth framework allows us to 
obtain more realistic growth rate, notably in developing countries, where the growth rate 
in consecutive years lies between zero and one, which depends on the degree of capital 
stock accumulation.
In our model, there are also two types of agents and one consumption goods. The 
first type of agent is called as non-entrepreneur who lives until the second period, while 
the second one is called as entrepreneur who lives until the third period (the period of 
production). Further stylized fact in our model is that we distinguish the behaviour vis-à-
vis  of  risk  between  non-entrepreneur  and  entrepreneur.  More  precisely,  the  utility 
function of non-entrepreneur follows the constant relative risk aversion form (Bencivenga 
and Smith, 1991) and the utility function of entrepreneur follows linear form which is 
also  used  by  Azariadis  and Smith  (1998)6.  Using  these  features,  we  provide  some 
innovative findings. 
5 Externalities  changes  due  to  human  capital  and  technological  innovation  may  be  less  important  in 
developing  countries,  so  that  they  might  not  much  play  pivotal  role  in  boosting  economic  growth. 
Meanwhile,  using the  Neo-classical  growth  allows  us  to  obtain  more  realistic  growth  rate,  notably  in 
developing countries, where the growth rate lies between zero and one. 
6 The reason why we use this hypothesis is that entrepreneur’s behavior should be more risky than non-
entrepreneur’s behavior. See Baumol (1990) who analyzes the riskiness of entrepreneurship activity which 
may be unproductive or even destructive. This fact should not be neglected by financial sectors whose role 
is  to  provide  financing  for  entrepreneurship  activity.  Moreover,  the  construction  of  risk-neutral 
entrepreneurs following Azariadis and Smith (1998) allows us to consider private information in the side of 
entrepreneurs  that  may be  a  source  of  risk-shifting  trigger  from entrepreneurs  to  financial  sectors,  as 
exemplified by  Stiglitz  and Weiss (1981). However, we do not incorporate how asymmetric information 
problems affect economic growth.
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First innovation, we find that entrepreneurship is always growth-enhancing factor, 
since the optimal amount of long-term investment is positively related with the fraction 
of entrepreneurs, the income of long-term investment and short-term ventures, as well as 
the agent’s savings (wage) rate. Despite the income of short-term ventures is positively 
related with the optimal amount of long-term investment, it does not necessarily mean 
that short-term ventures become a pivotal factor to increase long-term investment. This is 
because the income of short-term ventures is always lower than the income of long-term 
investments.  Thus,  entrepreneurship  is  always  preferable  to  non-entrepreneurship. 
Moreover, agent’s savings variable does not appear in the optimal amount of long-term 
investment  à  la Bencivenga and  Smith  (1991),  where  it  indicates  that  financial 
intermediation  always  has  capacity  to  increase productivity  without  necessarily  needs 
proportional agent’s savings as input. Thus, regarding to the recent emerging literatures 
on bank efficiency,  Bencivenga and Smith’s (1991) model does not accommodate the 
potential agency problems within banking institution, which in turn may increase bank 
inefficiency and impedes economic growth7. Conversely,  our model indirectly builds a 
link between bank efficiency  and economic  growth,  since  higher  agent’s  savings  are 
associated  with  an  increase  in  the  optimal  amount  of  long-term investment.  If  bank 
efficiency is too low, then agent’s savings cannot directly increase productive long-term 
investment due to the problems of the choice of investment between bank shareholders 
and  managers8.  Thus,  our  model  implicitly  assumes  that  financial  intermediation  is 
efficient.  Second innovation,  our  model  is  characterized  by the existence of  multiple 
7 See amongst of them, Hasan et al (2007) who find that efficiency in banking boosts economic growth in 
European  economic  agglomeration  regions,  as  well  as  Koetter and  Wedow (2006)  who  analyze  the 
importance of bank’s efficiency for economic growth in Germany.
8 Berger and Di Patti  (2006) test the presence of agency problems in banking using the profit function 
efficiency  approach.  The  profit  function  efficiency  may  measure  how bank  maximize  their  inputs  to 
generate outputs. 
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stationary states with threshold effect which impedes the economy to raise initial capital. 
In this case, the presence of financial intermediation may decrease threshold point and 
ensure the existence of higher long-run capital stock accumulation. While there are some 
empirical literatures finding that the presence of threshold effect may adversely affect 
economic growth, at our best knowledge, there are no much attempts to build theoretical 
foundation on this issue9. And our paper fulfills this gap.  
The rest of this paper is then organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model 
set-up. Section 3 models the self-financed system through financial market. Section 4 
models  the  bank-based  financial  system.  Section  5  builds  the  study of  capital  stock 
dynamic and threshold effect. Section 6 concludes. 
2. The Set-up
The model we use is one of overlapping generations with three periods. There are 
young generation, middle-age generation, and old generation. Each agent may live for 
two or three periods. Each generation is defined by a continuum of agents. The size of 
population in the period t is denoted by NN t = . Let t be the time index. At t = 0 an old 
generation is endowed with an initial per firm capital stock of 0k  units, as well as at t = 1 
a middle-age generation is also endowed with an initial per firm capital stock of 1k  units. 
Each young agent is endowed with one unit  of  labour in the first  period, where it  is 
supplied inelastically and there is unique consumption good. 
In this model, all agents of a generation are identical at the first period of life. At 
the beginning of the second period of life, there are two-period-lived agents and three-
period-lived  agents  with  probability  )1( pi−  and  pi ,  respectively.  We call  that  three-
9 See for example, Mihci (2006) who empirically analyze threshold effect in the finance-growth nexus. Or, 
Crouzille et  al  (2007) who find the presence of threshold effect  in financial development and regional 
growth in Philippines. 
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period-lived  agents  as  entrepreneur  and  two-period-lived  agents  as  non-entrepreneur. 
Thus, there are N)1( pi−  agents who will be non-entrepreneur at the second period of life 
and Npi  agents who will be entrepreneur at the third period of life. All young agents save 
entirely their labour income in the first  period, so the consumption of agents is zero. 
Meanwhile, if agents are non-entrepreneur, they consume their savings and return in the 
second  period  ( )tc1 .  But,  if  agents  are  entrepreneur,  they  consume  the  profit  of 
production in the third period ( )tc2 .  Thus, the liquidity need of agents will be different if 
they  become  non-entrepreneur  or  entrepreneur.  The  non-entrepreneur  have  higher 
liquidity need because they live only for two periods. Meanwhile, the young agents have 
incentive  to  be  entrepreneur  because  the  profit  of  long-term investment  is  relatively 
higher  than  the  return  of  non-entrepreneur’s  saving.  Therefore,  we  assume  that 
entrepreneurs are risk-neutral. Finally,  whatever the type of agents, we can define the 
agent’s preferences by the following expected utility function.
( ) tttt ccccU 2121 )1(),( pi φγ
pi γ +
−
−
=
−
      (1),
where itc  is the period i consumption of an agent who is born at t. The constant relative 
risk aversion is denoted by 0>γ . And, φ  is individual specific random variable realized 
at the beginning of period 2. Thus, the value of φ   is equal to 0 with probability pi−1 , or 
1 with probabilitypi . 
In order to complete this model, we characterize the production function and the 
entrepreneur’s  behaviour.  The  entrepreneur’s  production  ( ty )  is  realized  by  physical 
capital ( tk ) and units of labour ( tL ). For the sake of simplification, we use the Cobb-
Douglas production function as follows
θθ −
=
1
ttt LAky       (2)
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where [ ]1,0∈θ  is the part of production that uses tk  and A is an arbitrary coefficient. For 
simplification,  we  assume  that  capital  depreciates  completely  at  the  end  of  period. 
Furthermore, there is no endowment of capital at period 0>t  except for the initial old 
generation and the initial middle-age generation. In order to complete the entrepreneur 
program, the profit function must be established. The entrepreneur’s profit ( tΠ ) is the 
difference between the production and the cost of quantity units of labour defined as 
follows
ttttttt LwLAkLk −=Π
− θθ 1),(        (3)
At the equilibrium of labour market, labour demand ( tL ) is equal to labour supply ( tN ) 
which is obtained by maximizing the entrepreneur’s profit subject to tL . Thus, we have 
θθ piθ tt kAw )1( −=  and  the  maximized  profit  function  at  each  period  t as  much  as 
θθ ψ tt kA=Π , with ψpi θθ == −− 11tL . 
3. Self-Financed System
This system also refers to an economy without the presence of bank as financial 
intermediation or we may call financial market. In the first period, both agents divide 
their savings between two financial instruments (liquid and illiquid assets). Liquid assets 
are considered as inventory of consumption goods. One unit invested in liquid asset at t 
will yield  0>n  units of consumption goods at both 1+t  and 2+t . In other hand, one 
unit invested in illiquid asset will yield  R units of capital goods at  t+2. And, if illiquid 
assets are liquidated at t+1, it means that agents sell out this asset for the ”scrap value” of 
x units of consumption goods, with nx <<0 . 
In order to establish budget constraint, let  *tz  and 
*
tq  be the proportion of liquid 
asset and illiquid asset saved by agents at t, respectively. Hence, we have
8
1** =+ tt qz        (4)
Furthermore, the saving at t is denoted as ts , where tt ws = . This saving may be divided 
to tt sz
*  units of liquid asset and tt sq
*  units of illiquid asset. And let SILL iii ,, be the interest 
rate  of  liquid  asset,  illiquid  asset,  and  sold-out  illiquid  asset  from  ”scrap”  value, 
respectively. Thus, the saving at  t is denoted as ts  and tt ws = , where ts  is divided to 
tt sz
*)1( pi−  units of liquid asset and  tt sq
*)1( pi−  units of illiquid asset.  Let  t1ω  be the 
income  of  non-entrepreneur  after  one  period,  then  ttsttLt sqiszi
**
1 )1()1( +++=ω  or 
tttt sxqzn )(
**
1 +=ω , where Lin += 1  and )1( six += . Since tt ws =  then 
 tttt wxqzn )(
**
1 +=ω        (5) 
If the agents are entrepreneur, then there is no consumption at period t and t + 1. Thus, at 
the beginning of the third period, the entrepreneurs sell their illiquid assets and re-invest 
it again into the financing of physical capital. Namely, they use their fund for production 
in the third period. Let  t2ω  be the income received by entrepreneurs after two periods, 
then ttILttLt sqiszi
**
2 )1()1( +++=ω . Since, ILiR += 1 , we have 
ttttt sqRszn
**
2 +=ω , where 2
*
+= ttt kwqR     (6.a)
and Rnx <<<0           (6.b)
Using budget constraints in the equation (4), (5) and (6.a), we now define the agent’s 
program when investment is self-financed in the following equation
( )ttttttttt nwqwRqAwqnwxqqU )1()()1(()1()( ***** −++


−+
−−
=
−
θ
γ
θ ψpi
γ
pi
      (7)
Hence, an agent chooses *tq  in order to maximize (7). From the first order condition, we 
obtain the optimal proportion of illiquid asset ( *tq ) as follows.
( )
)()(
)(
1
1
**
xnw
B
xn
nwqq
t
ttt
−
−
−
==
−− γ
      (8)
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where 



−
−
−
=
)(1
2
xnw
wARnw
B
t
tt ψθ
pi
pi θθ
     
This result is different from  Bencivenga and Smith (1991) in the sense that we 
define  *tq  as  a function of  tw ,  while  in  Bencivenga and Smith (1991),  
*
tq  does not 
depends on tw . It is straightforward to proof that *tq  is an increasing concave function of 
tw , n, R and pi  since all their first derivative value are positive. This means that higher 
motivation becomes entrepreneur (higherpi ) enhances the young agent’s preference to 
invest their labour income tw  into illiquid assets. It is confirmed that *tq  increases when 
tw  increases. Meanwhile, the income of illiquid investment (R) attracts the young agent 
to invest into the illiquid asset, since *tq  is an increasing function of R. Although 
*
tq  is 
also increasing along with n, the amount caused by the augmentation of n is always lower 
than the augmentation of *tq caused by R, as long as (6.b) is hold. In this examination, we 
assume that x = 0 in order to simplify the functional form. Beside that, the influence of x  
on *tq may be neglected due to (6.b), although it may probably increase
*
tq .
4. Financial Intermediation
In  this  part,  we  build  a  model  in  which  agent’s  financial  decisions  are 
intermediated through banking system, where the agent’s budget constraints are identical 
with the case of self-financed economy. Hence, we can directly define the program of 
financial intermediation realized by an institution called as “bank”. We assume that bank 
is a coalition of young agents who can be either non-entrepreneur or entrepreneur.  Let tz  
and tq  be the proportion of liquid and illiquid investment realized by banks, respectively. 
Thus, we have
1=+ tt qz      (9)
10
Banks ensure non-entrepreneur to receive  btR1  units of consumption goods at  t+1 from 
each unit invested at t as following10 
xqnzR ttt
b
t 211)1( ααpi +=−      (10)
where t1α  and t2α  are the part of liquid and illiquid asset liquidated at the second period, 
respectively. The bank chooses the values of t1α  and t2α . Moreover, banks also ensure 
entrepreneurs to receive btR2  units of capital goods at t+2 from each unit of time t illiquid 
investment and  btR2
~
 units of time  t+1 consumption goods from each unit  liquid asset 
invested at  t. For the withdrawal after two periods, there are pi entrepreneurs who must 
receive btR2  units of capital goods from each unit of illiquid investment. Thus, 
b
tR2pi  factor 
must be equal to the rest of illiquid asset )1( 2tα−  multiplied by the income of investment
tRq . Thus, the bank must provide capital goods for entrepreneurs as much as
tt
b
t qRR )1( 22 αpi −=      (11)
In addition, entrepreneurs must also receive btR2
~
 units of consumption goods for each unit 
of liquid investment at  t. The constraint  btR2
~
pi  must be equal to the rest of consumption 
goods ( t11 α− )  multiplied  by  nzt .  Thus,  banks must  provide  consumption  goods  for 
entrepreneurs as much as
nzR tt
b
t )1(
~
12 αpi −=      (12)
In the next step, we define the program of financial intermediation for two types of agent. 
Firstly,  there are  )1( pi− non-entrepreneurs  who will  liquidate  their  investment at  t+1. 
Thus, the bank must ensure the non-entrepreneur by holding t
b
t wR1  units of consumption 
goods  to  be  distributed  at  t+1.  Secondly,  there  are  also  pi  entrepreneurs  who  will 
liquidate  their  investment  at  the  beginning  of  t+2.  Thus,  the  bank  must  ensure 
10 The index b refers the banking interest factor
bR , where ∞≤≤− bR1 . 
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entrepreneurs by holding  t
b
t wR2  units of capital goods and  t
b
t wR2
~
 units of consumption 
goods to be distributed at  t+2. Using budget constraints in the equation (10), (11), and 
(12) we define the program of financial intermediation in the following relation
)~)(()()1(),( 22121 t
b
tt
b
tt
b
ttt wRwRAwRccU ++
−−
=
− θγ θ ψpi
γ
pi
          (13)
Note that in the third period (t+2), entrepreneurs will use their income of investment to 
finance physical capital and use it in the production. Hence, we  have  22 += tt
b
t kwR . In 
order to simplify condition in the equation (13), we assume that the bank should provide 
the liquidity at t+1, since none of the capital assets is liquidated “prematurely”. Thus, the 
bank should fulfil the following liquidity constraint
nRA >θ ψ      (14)
By this assumption, we can reduce some variables as follows. In the third period (t+2), 
the  bank  will  only  consider  the  existence  of  pi entrepreneur.  From  (11),  we  have 
2
2
(1 )t t t
t
Rq wk α
pi
+
−
=  is individual capital.  Since the entrepreneur realize the production 
to get the profit and fulfil nRA >θ ψ , then their profit is superior to all income of liquid 
investment, so that 
( )( ) ( )( )ttttt wqnwqRA pipiαθ ψ //)1( 2 >−    (15.a)
Equation (15.a) is fulfilled if and only if the bank set
02 =tα   (15.b)
Meanwhile, the bank also maximizes the expected utility of non-entrepreneur. It means 
that the bank will reallocate the non-entrepreneur’s illiquid assets into liquid assets at the 
beginning of t+1. For realizing this strategy, the bank will therefore set
11 =tα    (15.c)
Using (15.b) and (15.c), we simplify (10), (11) and (12), respectively, become 
12
n
z
R tbt
pi−
=
11      (16)
t
b
t q
RR
pi
=2      (17)
0~2 =
b
tR      (18)
Using (16), (17), and (18), and the budget constraint (9) we establish the program of 
financial intermediation as follows 



 


+


−
−−−
=
− θγ
pi
θ ψpi
piγ
pi tt
t
t
t
wRq
Anw
q
qU
1
1)1()(                  (19)
Hence,  banks will  choose  tq  to  maximize )( tqU .  From the  first  order  condition,  we 
obtain the optimal proportion of illiquid asset ( tq ) as follows
( )
t
ttt nw
Bwqq
γpi −−−
−==
1
1
1)1(1)(      (20)
where 
t
t
nw
wRA
B
ψθ
pi
pi θ
θ
2
1



=
. 
It is also straightforward to proof that tq  is increasing along with tw , n, R and pi . From 
the equation (8) and (20), we may establish the following proposition. 
Proposition 1
The optimal value of illiquid investment under financial intermediation is higher than the  
optimal value of illiquid investment under self-financed system.  In other words, we proof  
that *tt qq >
Proof: 
For  0=x ,  we then show  that  ( ) ( ) tt nwBnwB γγpi −−−− <− 1
1
1
1
1)1( . Thus, we examine if 
BB <1 . From 1B  and B , we only examine if
13
<


 


−
−− γ
θ
θ
ψθ
pi
pipi
1
1
2)1( tw
RA
γθθ ψθ
pi
pi −−


−
−
1
1
2 )(
1 tt
nwwAR      
Let  
γ
θ
θ
ψθ
pi
pi
−−



 


=
1
1
2
1 tw
RAD and
γθθ ψθ
pi
pi −−


−
−
=
1
1
2
2 )(1 tt
nwwARD ,  then  we 
simplify 21)1( DD <− pi .  Since  ]1,0[,
* ∈tt qq ,  then  { } { } 1maxmax 21 == DD .  Thus,  the 
inequality  21)1( DD <− pi  is  proved  because 1)1(0 <−< pi .  Finally,  Proposition  1  is 
proved.
5. Capital Stock Dynamic  and Threshold Effect
Firstly, in comparing the level of steady state capital stock under self-financed 
system and financial intermediation, we establish this following proposition
Proposition 2
The existence of banks in an economy enhances economic growth more significantly than  
the absence of banks.
Proof:  
In  the  case  of  bank-based  system,  economic  growth  is  determined  by  the  value  of 
pi
tt
t
wqR
k =+ 2 .  Meanwhile,  in  the  case  of  self-financed  system,  economic  growth  is 
determined by the value of of ttt wqRk
**
2 =+ . From Proposition 1, it is straightforward to 
find *tt µµ > , where 
t
t
t k
k 2+
=µ  and 
t
t
t k
k * 2* +
=µ , are the growth rate of bank-based and self-
financed model, respectively.  Proposition 2 is thus proved. 
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0k
tk
2+tk
*
2k
market
bank
*
1k
Since tq  and *tq  are both concave functions, then 2+tk  and 
*
2+tk  are also concave. 
In order to illustrate the capital dynamics, we run a numerical example and the graphic is 
shown as follows11. 
Figure 3. Capital Stock Dynamics
Corollary 1
In a bank-based economy,  *1k  is a critical point of threshold and  
*
2k  is a steady state  
equilibrium of capital stock if and only if *2
*
1 kk < . The analogous corollary also works in  
a self-financed economy. 
Since the solutions of equation  tt kk =+ 2  are  quite complicated, we then examine the 
characteristic of equilibrium point  *1k  and  
*
2k  through the function study showing that 
threshold effect exists. However, we only study Corollary 1 in the case of bank-based 
economy, since we have proved the importance of financial intermediation in Proposition 
2.  
11 Numerical examples are available from authors on request.
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tt kk =+ 2
Firstly, we know that  tq  is an increasing concave function of tw . Meanwhile, it 
is also straightforward to proof that θ
θ
piθ tt kAw )1( −=  is an increasing concave function 
of tk , since ∞=
→
t
t
k dk
dw
t 0
lim  and 0lim0 =→
t
t
k dk
dw
t
. Thus, by definition, tq  is also an increasing 
concave  function  of  tk .  Since  tq  is  an  increasing  concave  function  of  tk ,  thus 
pi
tt
t
wqR
k =+ 2 is also an increasing concave function of  tk . Moreover, we establish the 
following relationship.
( ) 










+++−
+



+−
−=
+
+
−
+
γθθ
γ
γpipi
γpi
θθ
1
1
1
1
1
1
2 )1(1
1
)1(
n
DnAk
nk
n
DR
dk
dk
t
tt
t    (21)
where 
γ
θθθ
θ
ψθθpi
pi
pi
+
−
+−










+−−


=
1
1
21
1
)1((
n
AkRA
D
t
Using (21) we establish the table of variation of 
pi
tt
t
wqR
k =+ 2  as follows.
Table 1. Function Study of 
pi
tt
t
wqR
k =+ 2
tk 0 0; ≈→ cck t abcbkt <<=∃ ;
,  tk .
tk  = a + ∞→tk
t
t
dk
dk 2+ 0
− ∞=
+
→
t
t
ck dk
dk
t
2lim 0lim 2 =+
=
t
t
bk dk
dk
t
1lim 2 >+
=
t
t
ak dk
dk
t . 
1lim 2 <+
∞→
t
t
k dk
dk
t
2+tk
θθ piθ tt kAw )1( −=
0
∞− ∞− 0 ∞+
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It is straightforward to obtain − ∞=
+
→
t
t
ck dk
dk
t
2lim , where 0; ≈→ cck t . Meanwhile, we also 
find that 1lim
2 <+
∞→
t
t
k dk
dk
t
. Thus, 2+tk  is an increasing concave function of tk . But, there is 
also a threshold point at  ak t = , thereby  02 =+tk  and  1lim
2 >+
=
t
t
ak dk
dk
t
. Unfortunately, in 
order to find the value of a, we must run numerical simulations due to the functional form 
complexity12.
Here,  our  purpose  is  to  analyze  why  threshold  effect  may  worsen  capital 
accumulation. Suppose that 0k  is the initial capital of an economy which lies below the 
threshold point of self-financed system (see market curve at Figure 3). In order to reach 
the long-run steady state capital, 0k  should be iterated by financial intermediation curve 
(see bank curve at Figure 3) which in turn may converge to  *2k . Contrary if  0k  is only 
iterated by the self-financed system curve (see  market curve at Figure 3), the economy 
will disappear because the steady state capital stock tends to zero. Hence, we show that 
bank-based system is better than self-financed system in order to ensure the existence and 
uniqueness of long-run steady state capital stock, as well as to reduce threshold level. 
Long-run economic growth is thus improved by the presence of financial intermediation, 
as  long  as  long-term productive  investments  increase  and  short-term ventures  as  the 
potential source of speculations can be minimized.
 
12 Since  the  proofs  of  function  characteristic  are  all  straightforward,  we do not  present  in  this  paper. 
However, all proofs as well as numerical simulations are available from authors on request.
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6. Conclusion
In providing further issue on the finance-growth nexus,  we have reevaluated the 
model of self-financed economy and bank-based economy  à la Bencivenga and Smith 
(1991). Our novelties are twofold. Firstly, in modelling the finance-growth nexus, we use 
the Neo-classical growth framework rather than the endogenous growth as developed by 
Bencivenga and Smith (1991). Secondly, while drawing the Bencivenga-Smith’s (1991) 
model,  we  distinguish  the  behaviour  vis-à-vis  of  risk  between  non-entrepreneur  and 
entrepreneur. 
Using these features, we find that bank-based system is better than self-financed 
system (financial market) in order to ensure the existence and uniqueness of long-run 
steady state of capital stock which is a necessary condition to achieve long-run economic 
growth.  Moreover,  we  found  that  any  level  of  financial  development  (both  through 
financial  intermediation  and  financial  market)  may  raise  a  threshold  effect.  But  the 
presence  of  financial  intermediation  clearly  reduces  threshold  level  and boost  higher 
long-run steady state of capital stock. The presence of threshold effect is a new finding, 
since  it  may  capture  the  difficulty  of  raising  initial  capital. Thus,  the  presence  of 
threshold effect should be taken into account in future research on the finance-growth 
nexus,  notably in developing countries,  where externalities  due to human capital  and 
technological innovations are not yet well-improved. 
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